e expect the premise of this article-that one can and should forecast manager alphas-to be challenging for many readers. In our experience, many investment professionals simply do not believe that fund manager alphas can be meaningfully forecasted. There is some irony in this reaction: Our observation includes many, if not most, of those people whose actual daily work is dominated by the task of selecting and monitoring active fund managers.
Selecting active fund managers and building portfolios of them is an exercise in active management completely parallel to the work of conventional active fund managers in selecting securities. The only difference is that the securities selected are not "atomic" securities (the individual securities out of which fund managers build their portfolios) but "molecular" securities, the portfolios themselves, which are built up from many atoms. And when a sponsor builds a portfolio composed of these molecular securities, the usual prescriptions for active portfolio construction still apply. The objective function for portfolio optimization is the same for the sponsor as it is for the fund manager: to maximize expected portfolio alpha (net of fees) at an acceptable level of active risk.
2 And some forecast of future performance seems essential to either task.
As its point of departure, this article relies heavily on Waring, Whitney, Pirone, and Castille (2000) and Waring and Siegel (2003) . These articles discuss methods for building portfolios of active fund managers. The Waring and Siegel article, in particular, promised further improvements in these forecasting methods. It is that promise that we mean to honor here.
Why Forecast Alphas?
Although many sponsors try mightily to avoid making specific forecasts of manager alphas, we would point out that the sponsor's holdings of active managers already contain embedded forecasts of the alpha for each manager. One simply needs a specially fitted optimizer-a "reverse optimizer"-to tease the alpha forecasts out.
3 Assume that the sponsor thinks of its portfolio of managers as optimal, which in the context of active manager selection means that the sponsor portfolio maximizes the expected overall portfolio alpha at a given level of overall portfolio active risk. A reverse optimizer can back out the alpha forecasts that are required for the portfolio of managers to be optimal.
We have conducted this exercise with many sponsors' portfolios, and we are often surprised by the huge expected alphas that are implied by the large holdings of some of their active managers (and particularly by the large holdings of those managers who take a lot of active risk). But our main point is not that the implied alpha forecasts are sometimes impossibly large; our point is that they are there. One Forecasting is really hard, especially when it is about the future.
-Attributed to Niels Bohr 1
M. Barton Waring is a managing director and chief investment officer for investment policy and strategy, emeritus, for Barclays Global Investors, San Francisco. Sunder R. Ramkumar is a strategist with the Client Advisory Group at Barclays Global Investors, San Francisco.
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www.cfapubs.org ©2008, CFA Institute cannot build a portfolio of active managers without making alpha forecasts for each manager, either explicitly or implicitly. Doing so explicitly is much better. Explicit alpha forecasts can give the sponsor more meaningful guidance regarding which fund managers to hire, whether to fire or retain a manager, and how to weight the managers in the portfolio. And such forecasts are essential to a welloptimized portfolio of fund managers.
Why Do Sponsors Resist Making Explicit
Alpha Forecasts? Reluctance to make alpha forecasts may reflect an underlying skepticism that any fund managers are capable of delivering positive alpha consistently. After all, professionals in the sponsor organization would have been lectured repeatedly during their formal finance education that "the market is efficient" so "you can't beat the market." Perhaps the real reason they continue to hire active fund managers is that their boards and committees expect them to, not because they believe doing so will add value. If the sponsor's board or committee expects the sponsor to hire and retain active fund managers but the sponsor secretly does not believe that managers can be successfully chosen ex ante, the sponsor might prefer a process that does not require any decision other than whether to hire or not hire the fund manager who appears to be "best" in a beauty contest parade of applicants-which is today's dominant method of selection. Someone with such a mind-set might naturally wish to avoid claiming much credit for success or being held accountable for failure, and the beauty contest process supports such an aspiration admirably! We could posit other explanations for current practice, but the conclusion is the same: Practical results could be much improved by either (1) carefully applying skill to the task of making alpha forecasts or (2) giving up on the use of active management and defaulting entirely to inexpensive index funds.
As we will see, one can, in fact, build portfolios of securities and hire active fund managers successfully-that is, with an ex ante expectation of a positive expected alpha-given certain conditions. The finance professors who taught us that "you can't beat the market" were only correct as far as they went. Let's go farther.
The Two Conditions for Success in Active Fund Management. Few finance professors would assert today that markets are perfectly efficient. Most of them (as well as most practitioners) would agree that the markets generally approach efficiency without attaining it. It is in the imperfections-those bits of price-relevant information or knowledge that
are not yet efficiently and fully impounded in prices-that opportunities for above-market returns might be found.
But we must be careful here. Many investors express the belief that one should always choose active fund managers (instead of index funds) in any market that is inefficient. But this belief is seriously in error. Some inefficiency in the relevant market is a necessary condition for the expected success of active fund management, but it is not a sufficient condition: Even the most inefficient market imaginable-say, a "frontier" emerging market country-is still a zerosum game, in which the returns of all active players sum to the return of the market itself. (That is, an index fund of that market will have mean performance, before fees and costs, with some active players beating it and some losing to it.) More than inefficiency is required for active management to beat an appropriate competing index fund.
What more is required for predictable, rather than random, success? The fund manager must either know something that others in the market do not know or understand more clearly something that is also known to others but not as well understood by them. The active manager has to have an edge over the other players in the market. For short, we call this edge "skill."
4 Formally, we refer to this skill as a "positive information coefficient."
5 Formally, the information coefficient is the correlation of a manager's forecasts with subsequent realizations, and it is a forward-looking concept: A fund manager has a positive information coefficient if the manager can, more often than not, predict which securities will have positive alphas (and what their magnitude will be) during the upcoming period. 6 Such special skill is the ingredient for fund manager success that is in limited supply and that is also difficult for the sponsor to assess. Investors do not want to play the great zero-sum gamechoosing to actively manage a portfolio rather than passively hold its benchmark-unless they believe that they have skill at identifying securities or other investment positions that will earn a positive alpha in the coming period.
So, the Two Conditions required for a specific active fund manager to have a positive expected alpha are • some degree of inefficiency in the relevant market and • above-average skill on the part of the fund manager. The first condition is easy for most people to accept. The second can be accepted as a general proposition by most, in the sense that some managers must have above-average skill or the Warren Buffetts of the world would have no honor. But it causes angst if we try to get specific: From a population of managers who obviously do not have above-average skill on average, how can one identify which managers do have special skill?
Let's turn to the perspective of the hiring sponsor.
The Two Conditions for Employing Active Fund Managers. What must a sponsor believe before deciding to hire active fund managers-that is, if the sponsor wants to hire a portfolio of active fund managers having a collectively positive expected alpha?
First, the sponsor has to believe that successful active management is, in the abstract, possible. Although traditionally this belief has been poohpoohed ("you can't beat the market"), we hope we have been persuasive in the prior section that this is, in fact, possible (and we argue for it in greater detail later). So, the sponsor must accept the first set of the Two Conditions as expressed in the prior section, under which one can believe that good fund managers might, in fact, exist. A more intuitive way to express this is that the sponsor must first believe that some "good" fund managers do exist.
Second, the sponsor has to be able to move from the general to the specific: It must believe that it has the skill to identify fund managers that have skill-that is, the skill to differentiate between the good, the bad, and the indifferent fund manager, before the fact.
7 So, the key to success for sponsors is also skill.
Skill. In short, two very separate levels of skill are required: The sponsor needs to have skill at identifying fund managers who have skill at picking securities and other investment positions.
Across the universe of players, skill averages to a value of zero. The average investor gets the market return, which is a way of summarizing Sharpe's wonderful 1991 article, "The Arithmetic of Active Management," in which he so eloquently showed that the market is a zero-sum game. More completely, the market is a negative-sum game, with the negativity reflecting the necessary impact of fees and costs incurred in the effort of playing the game.
But not everybody is average! In fact, in nearly any skill-based activity, whether it is buying stocks or figure skating, there is a wide distribution of skill levels among the population engaged in the activity. Most of us have recognized ever since some junior high school teacher explained she was grading "on the curve" that some few are destined to earn an A and equally few will earn an F, that more will earn a B or a D, and that the greatest number are going to get a C. The bell curve, or normal distribution, does a great job of lending intuition to the notion that some of us are more skillful than others, and it is logical to assume that this distribution is a decent descriptor of skill or talent in any endeavor-including active management.
What does it mean to have skill in active management? Because the average player in the markets is fairly well educated and intelligent, the skill levels needed are those that stand out in a tough crowd. To be considered skillful in this particular sense requires more than merely being smarter than the average human being or even being more skillful as an investor than the general population. To have an expectation of being a successful active manager, one must have skill that is above average relative to the skill of others who are "playing the game" of trying to beat the market. That is, one must be above average in an above-average domain. If active management were a zero-sum game, then perhaps half of those actually playing (that is, of those thinking themselves good enough to give it a try) would have sufficient skill. But because it is a negative-sum game, only something less than half of the players will be skilled enough to win after covering their fees and embedded costs (and to win by enough to justify the additional risk taken on).
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The good news for sponsors that plan to hire active managers, however, is that skill levels do, in fact, vary widely. The market is a mechanism by which the more skilled can profit at the expense of the less skilled. So, good players almost certainly must exist, both at the fund manager level and at the sponsor level. A sponsor with skill at identifying fund manager skill has a serious edge.
Comparing Techniques for Building Portfolios of Managers. Today's most common manager selection approaches almost never include an explicit alpha-forecasting process. The widely used beauty pageant approach tries to pick the best manager, but little or no effort is made to quantify specific expectations for future alpha (unless one gives credit to the effort to sort out future performance by studying past performance, a dangerous credit to extend). Of course, there is a hope that the manager chosen will at a minimum outperform the appropriate benchmark.
9 After all, staff members, committees, and boards do take their tasks seriously, and if the "best manager" from this process were not even expected to outperform an index fund, then one supposes (or at least hopes) that the manager would not be chosen.
Not only is the list of managers selected important, but so are the weights given to these managers. In today's practice, manager weights are often dictated by the desire to fill out "style boxes," a method that assigns weights based on the styles (i.e., multifactor beta characteristics) of the fund www.cfapubs.org ©2008, CFA Institute managers. So, managers are selected in a series of beauty contests, and then the portfolio is built by investing in those managers in amounts sufficient to fill out each style box's required weight.
In contrast, Waring et al. (2000) provided a different method. The authors extended the active portfolio construction approach of Grinold and Kahn (2000a) up one level-from the fund manager's problem to the sponsor's problem. They showed that the ideal portfolio of managers is an optimized one that maximizes overall expected alpha (summed across the managers) at a given or "acceptable" level of active risk (also taken collectively across the managers). To build such a portfolio, expected alpha must be specifically estimated for each candidate fund manager. The method has become known as "manager structure optimization" (MSO).
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Soon after those publications, Kahn (2000) showed that in an ideal optimized portfolio of managers, manager weights, , would be proportional to the manager's expected alpha, , divided by expected active variance, :
Equation 1 is algebraically equivalent to saying that the total "bet"-that is, the optimal manager weight times the manager's active risk-is proportional to the manager's expected information ratio, IR:
The perspectives of Waring et al. and of Kahn show-and for the same reason-that expected fund manager alpha is one of the most important determinants of the ideal weights of managers in the portfolio.
So, it does not make sense to hire active fund managers simply because they are active-ever. And hiring active fund managers without making and using explicit expected alpha forecasts for each of them is definitely suboptimal. Moreover, not surprisingly, the expected alpha will also have an important impact on the weight given to each manager selected. Thus, optimal portfolios of fund managers require specific estimates of expected fund manager alpha.
Do Historical Alphas Help Forecast Future
Alphas? The regulator's required disclaimer to the effect that "past performance is no guarantee of future performance" is correct, but it can be overgeneralized to mean that historical data never contain any useful information. That interpretation would not be true, but even so, with rare exceptions, whatever information does happen to be in the data is extremely difficult to ferret out with any confidence.
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One method of extracting information from the data might be to use a statistician's tools for separating skillful from unskillful historical performance. A difference-of-means test (which provides the familiar t-statistic) could be used in an attempt to reject the null hypothesis that the historical alpha of the fund manager has a zero mean (before fees). Few managers' data sets will "pass" such a skill test, however, because by construction, passing generally requires something like a 95 percent confidence level. 12 This situation is a real challenge to the widespread practice of giving heavy weight to historical fund manager alpha. If one cannot claim with reasonable certainty that the fund manager's mean historical alpha is significantly different from zero-if it does not pass the t-test-the statistician has a strict prescription for these sponsors: Simply throw the historical data away and completely disregard them when considering the manager's future alpha. Only other data, most likely fundamental data, can be fairly considered in this event.
The prescription is only slightly more helpful if the fund manager's data do pass the t-test. If a 95 percent confidence interval is used, there is still a 5 percent chance that the strong performance was simply a random occurrence rather than the result of skill. As we said, getting information out of historical alpha data isn't easy.
The best conclusion is that passing the t-test provides only evidence of skill, not proof. Therefore, although the fact that a manager's historical alphas have passed a t-test is surely admissible (in the technical sense) in the process of evaluating fund managers, it is by no means conclusive as to the manager's skillfulness. The sponsor should also look at fundamental data. So, whether the data pass a t-test or not, historical data should be relied on much less than is found in current manager selection practices.
Here is another way to look at the historical data issue: If real information in the historical data is so difficult to tease out that a sponsor is not going to be successful in the effort, then any portfolio of fund managers constructed by the sponsor on the basis of those data is simply going to have random performance around the benchmark-that is, zero mean alpha before fees and costs and negative mean alpha after fund manager fees and costs. A portfolio based on such data, without skill, is a "closet index fund"-and one with high fees and high tracking error. It will deliver its beta, but it will only overperform or underperform randomly; its realized alpha over time will simply be Brownian motion-pure randomness with a negative bias. Such a portfolio, and sadly, it is the norm, creates the expectation that the efforts of the sponsor will result in true added value. But, in fact, it confuses motion with forward progress. A sponsor using historical data to project future alpha could reduce its active risk and improve after-fee performance simply by moving to an all-indexed implementation.
In contrast, if the portfolio of fund managers is assembled optimally, with skillful (after-fee) alpha forecasts that do not rely inappropriately on uninformative historical (or other) data, it will have a positive expected alpha at the total portfolio level, a characteristic that index funds obviously cannot have. Such an outcome can be achieved only by a sponsor that has and uses skill in identifying fund manager skill. There is no formula; there is no recipe; there are no shortcuts.
Skill necessarily implies the exercise of informed judgment. So, at some point, someone must make a claim of skill and be prepared to try to deliver on that claim. This person or group of persons needs to step up to the plate, make an informed but judgment-based forecast for the alphas of the candidate fund managers, and be accountable at the total portfolio level for being more right than wrong. We now present a methodology for sensibly approaching this task.
Forecasting Fund Manager Alphas
Two useful relationships are described in the active management literature that can be used to guide the search for a method of forecasting alphas. The first is the fundamental law of active management, which we shorten to the "fundamental law." The second is often called the "forecasting equation." Both are attributed to Grinold (1989 Grinold ( , 1994 . 13 Not surprisingly, both of these relationships are closely tied to skill, and given the two levels of skill required in our problem, we'll find this to be useful. We'll review these relationships in the context of this paper's task and then look at how to use them, or variations of them, to formally forecast fund manager alpha.
Relationship No. 1: The Fundamental Law.
The fundamental law is most often stated in a form that shows the relationship of a fund manager's expected portfolio information ratio to certain of its key determinants. The expected information ratio is the ratio of the portfolio's expected alpha, α, to the portfolio's pure active risk, ω. According to the fundamental law, the expected information ratio is a function of the information coefficient, IC, and of selection breadth, Br. In mathematical notation (with the expectations operators omitted from the variables to simplify the display), the law is
We have used a separator in the subscript notation, as in IC Mgr|Mgr , to help us keep track of, first, which player it is (the fund manager or the sponsor) that the estimate applies to and, second, which player is making the estimate or is responsible for the result. This example, IC Mgr|Mgr , means "the information coefficient of the manager in the view of the manager" (a self-assessed information coefficient). If it were IC Mgr|Spon , it would mean "the information coefficient of the manager in the view of the sponsor" and clearly could differ from IC Mgr|Mgr . Ditto for other variations.
In plain language, then, Equation 3 reads: "The expected information ratio of a fund manager's active portfolio, in the view of the manager, equals the expected information coefficient, or skill, of the manager (as assessed by the manager) times the square root of expected breadth of the portfolio."
In Equation 3, the information coefficient represents the fund manager's skill at forecasting the returns of the individual securities that may go into his or her portfolio. It is more formally defined as the expected correlation coefficient between forecast returns and subsequent realized returns.
Breadth, Br, represents the number of independent (uncorrelated) bets that the fund manager makes in the measurement period-usually, a year. It is a measure of the extent to which active bets are diversified or, more precisely, the extent to which forecasting skill is applied broadly among securities (or other investment positions). The breadth term in the fundamental law implies that the most consistently successful fund managers are those who apply their forecasting skill widely over a large number of independent bets. As Grinold and Kahn noted, the fundamental law boils down to a mandate to "play often, and play well." 14 Although the original fundamental law was derived in the absence of constraints, real-world portfolios are rarely unconstrained. Grinold and Kahn (2000a) demonstrated that the long-only constraint severely limits fund managers' abilities to implement their insights and results in a significant performance drag when such portfolios are compared with a similarly optimized but unconstrained portfolio. Thus, the fundamental law can be expanded to include an additional term, referred to as the "transfer coefficient," that reflects the performance drag or inefficiency resulting from constraints. 15 Stated another way, the transfer coefficient is the ratio of the information ratio of the ©2008, CFA Institute portfolio to the information ratio of a portfolio based on identical information but implemented without any constraints. So, the fundamental law, modified to incorporate the transfer coefficient, TC, and subscripted to apply to its ordinary perspective, that of the fund manager, is (4) We are interested in forecasting alphas, so we restate the fundamental law to focus on the expected alpha term by multiplying both sides of Equation 4 by expected active risk (moving ω to the right side of the equation): (5) So far, the point of view has been that of the manager, but the sponsor has not been forgotten. We will come back to the sponsor's role in a moment.
Relationship No. 2: The Forecasting Equation.
The forecasting equation is (6) Equation 6 means that the expected alpha of a security in the view of a portfolio manager is the product of the skill of the manager, times the active risk (standard deviation of residuals) of the security, times the z-score of the security-all as assessed by the manager. Grinold's purpose in developing this relationship was to help fund managers readily form forecasts of alpha for individual securities (not alphas for the fund manager portfolios themselves, consisting of many securities).
The z-score is a standardized variable that reflects the fund manager's evaluation of the "goodness" of a security (or in the application we describe next, the sponsor's evaluation of the extent of the fund manager's skill). Mathematically, the z-score has a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Thus, "buys" would be assigned a positive z-score and "sells" a negative z-score. A z-score of 1, for example, suggests that the security is believed to be 1 standard deviation better than average; it would thus be better than roughly five-sixths of all stocks being assessed by that fund manager. Rarely would a security earn a z-score of 2, and a 3 would be a one-in-a-thousand event. If a fund manager had no view on a security, the manager would assign it a 0 z-score, implying no alpha expectation. The security's residual or pure active risk (ω Sec|Mgr ) is the standard deviation of the security's monthly or annual alphas over time. The more volatile the security's alpha, the greater the opportunity to profit from its price moves-for example, by buying it on its upswing and selling it on its downswing. Thus, a higher volatility translates into a higher expected alpha, for a given level of skill.
This forecasting formula is Bayesian, in essence. It begins with a raw forecast-that the security alpha is the product of the standard deviation times the z-score assigned to the security by the manager-thus, for the moment, treating this result as if it were a perfect forecast. The formula then modifies this raw forecast, correcting it back toward the null hypothesis (or "prior") that the unconditional forecast is zero by multiplying it by the skill term-the manager's own information coefficient.
The "Alpha-Builder" Forecasting Framework. We now have the building blocks for a very complete forecasting framework and can tie them together. A prior article (Waring and Siegel 2003) provided a preliminary approach to forecasting alpha consisting simply of the Grinold forecasting equation with minor adjustments to adapt it to the problem of sponsors assessing the expected alpha of managers:
(7) Equation 7 reads: "Expected alpha for a fund manager, in the view of the sponsor, is equal to the sponsor's skill times the fund manager's expected level of active risk, ω Mgr , times the unit normal z-score, z Mgr|Spon , assigned to the fund manager by the sponsor as an expression of the sponsor's view of that fund manager's skill level, minus fees."
In practice, this forecasting equation seemed to produce reasonable results when used with the technology for optimizing fund manager structure and budgeting fund manager risk described earlier. Yet, we were convinced that it could be improved. For one thing, this formula clearly does not explicitly incorporate the two levels of required skill. For another thing, it does not incorporate other known important variables, such as fund manager breadth and the transfer coefficient. We anticipated further developments; this article is the result. 16 The first major improvement is that we directly evaluate the fund manager's forecasting skill, the information coefficient, rather than the manager's alpha as we did in the prior effort. And second, we make it so that whenever a sponsor assesses fund manager skill, the methodology requires a self-assessment of the sponsor's skill at To do this, we tie together a new form of the forecasting equation with a form of the fundamental law to complete the description of the fund manager's expected alpha at the level of the manager's total portfolio. 17 Adapted to apply to the sponsor's skill at assessing fund manager skill, the forecasting equation looks like this (see Appendix A): (8) Equation 8 means that the expected information coefficient of a fund manager in the view of the sponsor is the product of the sponsor's (selfassessed) skill at manager evaluation, the standard deviation (cross-sectional) of fund manager information coefficients, and the z-score of the particular fund manager's information coefficient (in the view of the sponsor). This relationship explicitly incorporates both the sponsor's skill level in assessing fund manager skill and the fund manager's skill.
Combining the two relationships, we substitute the sponsor's estimate of the manager's information coefficient, IC Mgr|Spon , from Equation 8 in place of the fund manager's self-estimated information coefficient, IC Mgr|Mgr , into the fundamental law, Equation 5. This transfers the responsibility for the resulting estimate of the fund manager's alpha to the sponsor:
Writing Equation 9 out in full by using the righthand side of Equation 8, we get (10) Equation 10 has the happy benefit of reflecting the need to quantify the sponsor's skill at assessing manager skill as well as incorporating both the breadth and the transfer-coefficient terms-all improvements to the first forecasting effort of Equation 7.
Finally, parallel to the earlier effort, we subtract fees:
Equation 11 is our model of expected fund manager alpha in a complete form. This approach, which we refer to casually as "alpha-builder," involves seven input variables, and all but two of them are relatively straightforward to estimate.
The Input Variables. We can provide some guidance in estimating values for all seven input variables, although the fund manager's z-score and the sponsor's own information coefficient will always be the values that are most challenging.
■ Fund manager z-score . Fund manager z-scores are the most important input for forecasting expected alpha but, at the same time, among the hardest to assess. All but one of the other inputs are capable of being estimated via direct quantitative approaches, but the fund manager z-score usually depends on factors that are hard to quantify. They should be hard to judge, because the z-score is where the sponsor's skill level is testedif assessing z-scores were easy, everybody could do it! And if everybody could do it, there would be no alpha. Manager z-scores are inherently subjective and require the sponsor to exercise skillful and informed judgment.
The average z-score, taken across the universe of all market players, must be zero. The framework assumes that fund manager skill, as with most other human skills, is distributed approximately normally but (unlike most human skills) with a mean of zero. 18 Of course, assigning a z-score of zero (for our average fund manager) would result in an estimate that this fund manager's expected alpha is zero, less fees, which is consistent with a prior belief that only the above-average fund manager can be expected, before the fact, to succeed in the active management game.
By moving beyond the averages and focusing on the individuals, however, sponsors can conceivably design a set of criteria to assist in assigning z-scores, a kind of "fundamental analysis" approach to manager selection. A fund manager's historical track record would no doubt influence the assigned z-score, but other factors-such as quality and perceived insight of the research team, compensation structures, rigor of analytical processes, and generosity of research budgets-would be important to most thoughtful sponsors. This area is fertile for research by sponsors and fund-of-funds managers. Just as fund managers conduct research on factors that predict security returns, successful sponsors will focus on identifying factors that predict fund manager skill. 
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We see many sponsors attempt to reduce their selection efforts to a repeatable process or "recipe." An estimate of expected alpha, explicit or implicit, is likely to be worthless, however, if it can be reduced to a recipe. That is, skill and judgment have to be in the mix somewhere, and the use of a recipe inherently suggests that one is avoiding the use of skill or judgment. 19 We have found percentiles to be more intuitive for many sponsors than raw z-scores when evaluating fund managers. Because z-scores are inherently normally distributed, a percentile rank can be easily translated into a z-score by using standard probability tables. Table 1 indicates that a fund manager thought by the sponsor to be at the 84th percentile can be understood by the analyst to have an assigned z-score of +1 whereas a fund manager assigned a 98th percentile rank can be interpreted as having a z-score of +2.
■ Variability of fund manager skill .
This variable represents the cross-sectional standard deviation of skill (where skill is expressed as information coefficient) across the universe of generally similar active fund managers. Intuitively, one can understand that the greater the variations in fund manager skill, the greater the impact of sponsor skill in selecting a good manager-thus, the greater the sponsor's alpha expectations (even after being pared back by the action of the other terms of the forecasting approach). There is no direct way to observe this standard deviation, but one can back into it inferentially. We believe that an estimate of 0.07 for σ IC Mgr is sensible, and we note that this value is consistent with largecapitalization U.S. equity mutual fund data; we are currently using it and have found that it gives reasonable estimates. (As shown in the first examples in the next section, this value produces an information ratio of 0.50 for an active equity fund manager with an S&P 500 Index benchmark at an active risk level of 5.0 percent, which is typical of a traditional active manager who is at the first quartile of performance. 20 ) Obviously, there is some room to hope for improvement in this estimate, particularly when dealing with managers of asset classes other than large-cap U.S. equities. Until better data are available, however, we will use the 0.07 estimate for most benchmarks.
■ Sponsor skill . This variable may be the most difficult to assess of the seven in the model; it is certainly one of the two most difficult to estimate (the other being the z-score). IC Spon|Spon , the information coefficient of the sponsor in the sponsor's own view, is a quantification of the sponsor's skill in picking good active fund managersor, more precisely, of the sponsor's skill in assessing the fund managers' skill. IC Spon|Spon = 0 implies a before-fee expected alpha of zero, regardless of how high a z-score the sponsor may have given a particular fund manager: It means that the sponsor itself believes that its estimate of the manager's z-score is no good and should not be used (so it will not be used because multiplying by IC Spon|Spon = 0 yields a before-fee expected alpha of zero, no matter what the other inputs are). In other words, no matter how good the sponsor thinks a fund manager is, if the sponsor's judgments are not believed-even by the sponsor-to have any predictive ability, they are irrelevant and the sponsor should not expect any alpha.
Estimating sponsor skill is a problem in selfassessment. It is difficult to do in any completely satisfactory manner because the board, staff, and consultants involved in the process rarely have the data needed to demonstrate their own statistically significant performance. In fact, the more completely they understand the problem, the more modest they may be in claiming special skill. But these people may be precisely the ones who have the greatest chance of winning the game.
We are not going to tell anyone how to estimate his or her own skill, but we would start by noting that if a given sponsor is playing the active manager selection game, then it has also made an implied positive estimate of its skill, IC Spon|Spon . The game leaves the sponsor no room to be troubled by its inability to be certain about its own skill. The zerosum game of active management requires that one believe in oneself. Everyone and every group that has ever considered engaging in a sporting event or other contest has faced the same uncertainty in what are also usually zero-sum games, yet the games are never short of players. The zero-sum game of active management, as for most other games, requires only that one believe in oneself if one is going to play, and this is expressed as a positive IC. Such a boundary is not in itself a proper estimate of sponsor skill-far from it-but it represents a lower limit on the amount of skill a sponsor must have, given the prior intent to hire active managers, in order to be successful. The sponsor may well decide that its skill level is higher than the minimum level required to make the hiring of active managers a rational choice. But if the lower bound itself is used by the staff as its estimate of IC Spon|Spon , using the alpha-builder process will have the virtue of organizing fund manager expected alpha estimates in a form that is consistent from one manager to the next, putting them on a playing field leveled for costs, risks, breadth, and the transfer coefficient. Using the lower bound is a start, from which one can proceed to more sophisticated estimates if one chooses. 22 Many sponsors will prefer to express their selfestimate of skill as an expected future "win rate" rather than an information coefficient. For example, a sponsor might say, "I think about two out of every three fund managers that we pick, or 67 percent, will outperform." This estimate can be used to approximate the information coefficient. 23 Win rates (which we will designate p, the probability of success) range from 0 percent to 100 percent; information coefficients, being correlation coefficients, range from -1 to +1. We can convert the win rates to the information coefficients by using the following: (12) Thus, if the sponsor anticipates being right 67 percent of the time, IC Spon|Spon is fairly approximated as 0.34; if the win rate is 50 percent, then, of course, IC Spon|Spon is 0.00. Table 2 lays out this relationship. In the next section, we examine the impact of various information coefficients.
Any degree of error introduced by misestimating the sponsor's information coefficient will, of course, affect the results. An obvious example is that a sponsor mistakenly claiming an information coefficient of 0.30 but having a true information coefficient of 0.00 will achieve a return that is randomly distributed around the benchmark with a mean of zero, minus fees and costs.
Furthermore, low sponsor information coefficients favor low-fee and low-tracking-error managers. As the sponsor's own information coefficient approaches zero, the net expected alpha for the manager derived in our framework will begin to approach manager fees. 24 In this case, any optimizer will simply pick the managers with the lowest fees and lowest active risk-that is, index funds. This result should not be a surprise. A sponsor with no confidence in its ability to pick managers shouldn't really be investing in active managers.
Anyway, if a sponsor is going to play the great zero-sum game of active manager selection, and play to win, the sponsor must take responsibility for the critically important self-assessment embodied in its estimate of IC Spon|Spon . Without doing so, and coming up positive, a sponsor simply cannot justify hiring active managers.
■ Fund manager breadth . Breadth is the number of statistically independent investment bets made by an active manager each year. Greater breadth results in more diversification of the residual risk from the active management effort and, all else being equal, improves the consistency (reduces the standard deviation) of the fund manager's performance. If that fund manager has skill, such that his expected alpha is a positive number, then as the standard deviation of the residual risk decreases, the percentage of the time that the fund manager's realized alpha is above zero increases. In the same way, the house in Las Vegas operating a roulette wheel, with its tiny built-in house advantage, is almost completely safe if it handles a million bets for a dollar each but is taking an unacceptably high risk by handling one bet for $1 million.
Despite the simplicity of the concept, estimating breadth in practice is not an exercise in precision, whether the estimate is being made by the manager or the sponsor. (The sponsor has even more difficulty than the fund manager in accurately estimating the manager's breadth because the sponsor lacks access to full information about the portfolio's construction and the reasoning behind it.) Few forecasts are completely independent, and many (or most) are highly correlated. An active fund manager benchmarked to the S&P 500 might hold all 500 stocks in her portfolio and might turn the portfolio ©2008, CFA Institute over 200 percent per year, which would imply that she has made 1,000 independent decisions. But breadth for this manager could easily be much less than 1,000 if the forecasts were driven by certain common factors and, therefore, are correlated-as is likely to be the case most of the time. For example, fund managers may assign higher expected alphas to stocks that have done well recently (a momentum factor) or stocks in the technology industry (an industry factor). In these examples, the fund manager is essentially making only one informed bet (on momentum or on an industry) despite appearing to follow all the stocks in the benchmark.
Nonetheless, a safe point for the sponsor to start the estimation process is to assume that most fund managers' breadth is proportional to the product of the number of securities being actively evaluated times the annual turnover.
25 But because of the number of signals used and their correlation, as discussed, this proportion is likely to be considerably less than 1. And the sponsor should certainly refine any such rough estimate by using any information it can obtain regarding the fund manager's signals and portfolio construction techniques. The goal is to meaningfully differentiate the fund managers from each other based on what they actually do.
■ The transfer coefficient . The transfer coefficient, as already noted, reflects the impact of constraints on the portfolio's performance. The most binding constraint on typical portfolios is the no-shorting restriction. It severely limits a fund manager's ability to implement negative views on securities and reduces the alpha potential of the portfolio.
We can estimate the transfer coefficient of longonly equity portfolios by using an empirical result presented in Grinold and Kahn (2000b) . They conducted simulations to examine the information ratios of optimal portfolios based on the same information but implemented with and without the long-only constraint. They measured the transfer coefficient related to the long-only constraint, denoted TC LongOnly , at varying risk budgets and for various benchmarks, and they found that their results fit the following polynomial expression well: (13) where γ(N) = (53 + N) 0.57 (it is simply a calibrating factor that they estimated empirically) and N is the number of securities in the benchmark portfolio.
Equation 13 demonstrates that the two factors that act to reduce the transfer coefficient most in a long-only portfolio are (1) a larger number of stocks in the benchmark (which reduces the average weight of the stocks and thus the amount by which the manager can express a negative view by not holding a stock) and (2) greater active risk in the portfolio (which increases the size of optimal active positions, which are then increasingly constrained if negative). The most "efficient" funds, thenthose with the highest transfer coefficients-will be those with low active risks that are operating in fairly narrow markets.
■ Active risk . The fund manager's active risk, or tracking error, represents the annualized standard deviation of the fund manager's residuals, or alphas. If a positive value is assumed for manager skill, higher active risk translates into a higher expected alpha. (The relationship is not linear, however, for long-only portfolios because portfolios with higher active risks are also penalized by having lower transfer coefficients.)
Active risk is perhaps the easiest variable to forecast. It is much more stable than alpha and can be reasonably estimated from historical data (usually with an acceptable degree of error, but there are exceptions). At the same time, the sponsor must be sure that the active risk it measures is estimated relative to the appropriate benchmark, or beta (or, usually, a mix of multifactor betas), one that represents the fund manager's opportunity set and process.
Many active fund managers have systematic style biases (value, small cap, etc.) that differ from their stated benchmarks. A simple style analysis can identify the fund manager's actual average style during the study period, and active risk should be measured relative to this benchmark if it has been relatively stable. Doing so provides for a clean separation of the beta and the alpha exposures and ensures that the sponsor is focusing on the "pure" alpha and pure active risk (Waring and Siegel 2003) . 26 ■ Fees . Ultimately, returns net of fees represent the true value added by the fund manager, so the sponsor should measure and account for fund manager fees somewhere in the process. Even a fund manager with skill will add no value to the sponsor if his fees are equal to or higher than his expected alpha. For this reason, note that z Mgr|Spon is evaluated on a before-fee basis in our formulation; fees are then subtracted explicitly by using a separate fee term. 
Examples
To demonstrate the alpha-forecasting framework, we first consider examples that illustrate the importance of sponsor skill by comparing the alpha expectations for sponsors with varying abilities in picking good fund managers. Then, we consider examples that explore the effects of the transfer coefficient and of breadth.
Impact of Sponsor Skill. We start with a simple demonstration of the impact of sponsor skill on alpha expectations. In these cases, a sponsor has identified a long-only active fund manager benchmarked to the S&P 500 with 5.0 percent tracking error. The sponsor 's staff and consultant are impressed with the fund manager's thoughtfulness, training, insight, and other characteristics (probably including past performance!). The sponsor assigns the fund manager a z-score of 0.67, a value indicating exactly borderline top-quartile skill (this figure is directly from the cumulative normal distribution table). Table 3 shows the evaluation of expected alpha from this manager in four sponsor scenarios, which vary as to the sponsor's self-assessment of its own skill at assessing fund manager skill and in the level of fees. In each case, breadth is assumed to be 500 and the estimate of the transfer coefficient for the S&P 500 benchmark comes from applying Equation 13.
Case 1 represents a plan sponsor, perhaps King Arthur's Round Table, Inc.-one whose founding seer, Merlin, still sits on the investment committee. With an IC Spon|Spon = 1.0, this sponsor has perfect ability to see the future for all fund managers. This clairvoyant sponsor can fairly predict a gross-of-fee expected alpha of 2.43 percent from this fund manager, resulting in an information ratio of about 0.50. 27 Unfortunately most sponsors do not possess such remarkable forecasting abilities. In Case 2A, we consider a sponsor with much lower, but still positive, skill, a humble IC Spon|Spon = 0.10. This sponsor also thinks the same fund manager is borderline top quartile and assigns the same z-score of 0.67 as was assigned in Case 1. So, with all inputs left unchanged other than the information coefficient, the estimated manager skill is far lower than in Case 1 and, therefore, the expected alpha is also far lower, at 0.24 percent. This sponsor knows that it will often be wrong in its evaluation of fund manager skill (45 percent of the time, from Equation 12) and will thus hire many fund managers who turn out to be duds. Thus, the sponsor's overall realized alpha will, in fact, be lower and its expectations should also be tempered in comparison with the prophetic sponsor in Case 1 that picks only good fund managers.
The picture becomes grimmer for this sponsor if fees are taken into account. Case 2B is the same as Case 2A except that it assumes a modest fee of 0.25 percent. After subtracting this fee, the net expected alpha becomes negative. Fees raise the bar on successful active management. Despite the fact that this fund manager is expected to be more right than wrong (the manager has a positive information coefficient of 0.005 from Equation 8), a minimum degree of manager skill is required to overcome the drag from fees, and this one does not meet the minimum. If the sponsor hires this manager, it must expect to lose a small amount of money.
Finally, Case 3 is an optimistic but not unrealistic sponsor that believes that for every 10 fund managers it chooses, 7 will be good, for a p = 0.70, which translates to an IC Spon|Spon of 0.40. This sponsor is also paying fees of 0.25 percent, so the expected after-fee net alpha is 0.72 percent. Although this is nowhere near as large a number as many sponsor professionals would claim if they were simply asked to "ballpark" an expected alpha for such a fund manager, it is a figure that can stand up to a discussion on many fronts-all of which are intimately related to the limits of the possible for how much alpha can be expected from a portfolio given the (fairly realistic) portfolio characteristics and investment process that we have assumed. These cases throw light on the importance of skill in active management. Although sponsors and fund managers are tempted to make overly optimistic alpha forecasts (3 percent and 4 percent forecasts of expected alpha will often be casually bandied about), actual realized returns for the portfolio of fund managers seldom reach such high levels. Skill levels need to be considered when setting expectations but usually are not. Invariably, expectations become more modest when sponsors are fully informed by following the alpha-builder forecasting process that fully incorporates skill estimates and other important variables.
Impact of Increasing Breadth. To examine some of the trade-offs associated with increasing breadth, we consider two long-only U.S. equity portfolios: Portfolio A is benchmarked to the Russell 1000 Index (large cap only), whereas Portfolio B is benchmarked to the Russell 3000 Index (in essence, the whole U.S. market). In this example, we'll make the simplifying assumption that breadth is equal to the number of securities in the benchmark, although that is not necessarily the case. The assumption means that for the same process, the portfolio benchmarked to the Russell 3000 has three times the breadth of one benchmarked to the Russell 1000. Both portfolios are run at identical 2.0 percent active risk by the same fund manager, who the sponsor believes has borderline top-quartile skill. The sponsor in this example is modestly confident of its abilities to spot good fund managers and, based on an expected win rate of 7 out of 10, assigns itself a sponsor information coefficient of 0.4. For the time being, we ignore fees and again assume σ IC Mgr|Spon = 0.07. Table 4 reveals some of the trade-offs associated with increasing the portfolio's breadth. An increase in breadth expands the opportunity set and thus increases the expected alpha of a portfolio in proportion to its square root. Benchmarks with more securities have lower average security weights, however, and thus allow smaller negative positions for long-only portfolios. This is the same as saying that the transfer coefficients of the resulting portfolios are lower. Using Equation 13, we estimate a 44 percent transfer coefficient for Russell 3000-based active portfolios, in comparison with a 62 percent transfer coefficient for a Russell 1000-based portfolio, where both have 2 percent active risk. This unhelpful relationship between breadth and the transfer coefficient in long-only portfolios opposes the helpful first-order effect of greater breadth.
The first-order effect of increasing breadth, however, being larger than the negative effect of a decreasing transfer coefficient, does prevail. Thus, all other things being equal, Portfolio B, benchmarked to the Russell 3000, has a higher expected alpha than Portfolio A, benchmarked to the Russell 1000.
The example becomes even more interesting if the sponsor assigns Portfolio B a lower z-score, z Mgr|Spon , than Portfolio A, reducing it to 0.50. This might be the case if the fund manager relies on fundamental analysis but is staffed with only a few analysts so its resources become thinner with increased breadth-resulting in a decline in forecasting accuracy. Table 5 shows the effect. Portfolio A remains the same as in Table 4 . The result is a decline in expected alpha to 0.48 percent for the revised Portfolio B, now less than the 0.53 percent predicted for Portfolio A despite the benefit of Portfolio B's much larger breadth. Therefore, increased breadth is useful only if the fund manager can sustain forecasting accuracy and intensity over a larger universe of securitiesthat is, if the increased breadth is, in fact, being used effectively.
Conclusion
The ability to forecast expected alpha is one of the keys to successfully employing active fund managers and deserves much more attention by sponsors. Sponsors need to proactively forecast alpha to ensure that their portfolios of fund managers are not merely random collections of past winners and losers.
Forecasting alpha is hard, but it can be done. The alpha-builder framework described here helps organize the effort logically. It identifies the variables that affect expected alpha, thus breaking up the estimation problem into pieces that are easier to estimate than fund manager skill taken as a whole. These variables, including sponsor information coefficient, active risk, breadth, and the transfer coefficient, are within the sponsor's estimation grasp. Certainly, alpha estimation cannot be done without grappling with estimating these variables at some level.
We have provided a rational means for scaling the two most difficult inputs, fund manager skill and the plan sponsor's skill at selecting fund managers, and incorporating these estimates with other important factors, such as active risk levels, breadth, fees, etc. The approach is reassuringly familiar, in that it is based entirely on two bits of comfortably well-accepted alpha-forecasting methods-the Grinold forecasting equation and the fundamental law of active management.
As with all mathematical formalizations of an inherently subjective decision-making process, the numerical answer may not be as important as the process itself. The manager evaluation framework suggested here is, therefore, analogous to a discounted cash flow valuation model for security selection: The model forces the user to think clearly about the validity and internal consistency of his or her assumptions and to communicate those assumptions effectively among the user's colleagues. Although the final manager selection decision may also involve factors not discussed here, the quantitative process of this framework itself is inherently valuable.
Before playing any game, it helps (a lot!) to know the rules of the game. For the negative-sum game of hiring fund managers, the rules require at least two levels of well-above-average skill. As in any game, there will be winners and there will be losers. The good news for those who desire to be winners is that simply understanding the rules and using them to guide one's actions can give one a tremendous advantage over the competition. 
Appendix A. The Sponsor's Version of the Forecasting Equation
Assume we have a set of next-period estimated z-scores for n fund managers, z Mgr(n)|Spon , all of whom are under consideration or already employed by the sponsor. These z-scores are unit-normal predictions made by and "owned" by the sponsor about how good each particular fund manager will be [here, z Mgr(n) |Spon is simplified to z n ].
Our intention is to use these forecasts to estimate the fund manager's actual, realized skill in the next period, or IC Mgr(n)|Spon (simplified here to IC n ). We will tease the required methodology out of the mathematics of regression analysis.
If we regressed the realized information coefficients of the managers on the z-scores predicted by the sponsors (we probably would not actually do this, but we could), we would be taking advantage of a relationship that has the form (A1) which means that the next-period realized information coefficient of the fund manager is the value of the fitted regression intercept, a, plus the product of the fitted slope, b, times the sponsor's estimated z-score for the manager, plus or minus an error term. If the average information coefficient and average z-score are both zero, consistent with our understanding that this is a zero-sum game, then a is also zero; we will make this assumption and will drop the a term out of the equation.
The regression equation makes obvious the imperfections in the forecast, of course: The realized information coefficients will include this pesky error term. But because the error term itself has a zero expectancy by construction, we can drop it when considering our best estimate of (or the expected) information coefficient. With this simplification, we see that the best estimate of the nextperiod information coefficient of the nth manager is really simply the slope term, b, times the z-score given the manager: 11. Numerous studies have examined the persistence of mutual fund performance; see Grinold and Kahn (2000a) for a survey. Although the findings have been mixed, because of differences in study period, time horizon, and methodology, the correlation between past and future performance generally appears to be fairly low. Even optimistic studies indicate that the probability of a past winner remaining a winner is only about 60 percent. 12. The probability levels actually used as boundaries for passing such a test (or, more properly, for rejecting the null hypothesis) depend on both the specific type of test and, to some extent, the judgment of the statistician establishing the confidence boundaries to be used. 13. Both relationships are also developed in Grinold and Kahn (2000a) . 14. In this context, by "play often," Grinold and Kahn (2000a, p. 162) mean that the skillful investment manager should make many specific, small, and unrelated bets-not that the manager should simply incur high turnover by betting frequently. 15. Clarke, De Silva, and Thorley (2002) developed this important generalization of efficiency. 16. See Waring and Siegel (2003, Note 25) . 17. The authors' colleague and friend Ronald Kahn suggested this particular way to combine the two forecasting equations, thereby cleverly and insightfully solving a problem that we had been working on for some time. 18. One might argue that the mean is not zero for professional fund managers but possibly positive as a result of a categorical difference in skill between individual investors and professionals. Waring and Siegel (2003) suggested, however, that if there is such a group effect, it is small, at least in the United States, perhaps only 50 bps or so-not enough to offset fees. Regardless of the argument, if an analyst thinks that the true mean for the relevant group of professional fund managers is different from zero, the analyst should simply add the difference to the results from the framework. 19. The exception might be for effects that have not yet been generally discovered and that remain unincorporated in prices. Many modern portfolio researchers look for such effects. Certain of these researchers may reduce their ideas to computer code (i.e., recipes) in apparent violation of the prescription in the main text. However, the required judgment is being exercised when the effect is chosen as a "signal" for the portfolio construction process and each time the signal is reviewed for continued inclusion. Moreover, over time, most such effects do become known, so the next opportunity to exercise skill is deciding when to remove a given signal from the overall model. Most commonly repeated recipes involve well-known ideas and are unlikely to be successful except by chance. 20. By "at the first quartile," we mean at the break point between the top 25 percent of managers and the next 25 percent. 21. There is nothing special about this number; we are using it simply as an example. But given typical values for the other inputs in Equation 11 , it is in the right range. 22. In fact, if the sponsor truly has the skill that the board's decision to be active presumes, this manner of backing into an estimate of IC Spon|Spon will improve the sponsor's results. And if the sponsor does not have skill, then the portfolio will be no worse off in expectation than it would be in the absence of the estimate. 23. Note that the expected win rate only approximates sponsor skill. Consider two sponsors with the identical expected win rate: Of the two, the one that overweights the best of its good managers clearly has more skill than the one that assigns them all equal weights (the sponsor gets value from estimating not only the sign of the manager's performance but also the magnitude). Regardless, using the expected win rate should provide estimates of the information coefficient that are in the right ballpark. 24. Fees are the only component of alpha that one can know for certain, and the fee amount does not require any estimate of sponsor skill. 25. The term "actively evaluated" keeps the emphasis on the number of securities that the manager follows and could potentially hold rather than on the number of securities currently in the portfolio. The number in the portfolio might underestimate breadth because a manager might omit a security from the portfolio simply to reflect a negative view. 26. Carrying out some sort of style analysis on fund managers will generally be better than using a simple benchmark when separating alpha from beta. The biggest exception is for style rotators, tactical asset allocators, and those whose styles are themselves the subject of intentional active bets and thus not stable over time. In such cases, style analysis may not effectively add to one's knowledge of the fund manager's beta. Regression is not powerful enough in the presence of time-varying beta bets. Other means, usually subjective, must be used. 27. Of course, an all-seeing sponsor would pick a better manager if the case gave the sponsor a richer sample to choose from; this manager is barely top quartile.
